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LEARNING IN CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION AS A FUNCTION 
OF SOCIAL CUES AND COMPLEXITY IN A FREE 
SOCIAL INTERACTION SETTING
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM 
Learning occurs most frequently in group situations where 
individuals exchange information, yet the most influential 
learning theories (e. g., Guthrie, 1959; Hull, 1951; Skinner, 
1953; Spence, 1958; Tolman, 19i|-9, 1959) including the more 
recent mathematical model theories, such as those presented 
by Estes (1950, 1963), Bourne and Restle (1959), and Restle 
(1955), have postulates based solely on the behavior of the 
individual working alone. Learning theoreticians of the past 
and present have tended not to give serious attention to social 
influences and their effects upon learning. The present study 
was designed primarily to accomplish three purposes; (a) to 
assess the effects of social cues on learning rates in concept 
learning within the framework of the extended mathematical 
theory of concept identification, (b) to compare the effective­
ness of two-person groups free to interact and exchange infor­
mation with one another with that of individuals working alone 
in solving concept identification problems of varying degrees
1
of task complexity, (c) to explore the relationship between 
patterns of social interaction and decision-making behavior in 
a situation where two persons must reach common decisions in 
their attempt to solve a two-choice concept identification 
task.
Nature of Research in Concept Identification 
The vast majority of studies dealing with concept identi­
fication has been concerned with a variety of experimental 
variables. Brown and Archer (1956) investigated distribution 
of practice; Pishkin (1961), misinformation feedback distri­
bution; Bourne and Bunderson (1963), delay of information 
feedback and length of postfeedback interval; Trabasso and 
Bower (196^3, memory; Pishkin and Blanchard (1961̂ .), auditory 
stimuli; Pishkin, Wolfgang, and Bradshaw (1963), drugs (hydrox­
yzine) and induced stress; and lastly, Pishkin and Wolfgang 
(1 9 6 5 ), availability and type of past information feedback.
The variable that has received the most attention in 
concept identification experiments is task complexity. Pre­
vious investigators of concept learning had no direct method 
of measuring task complexity systematically or independently 
of the subject's response. Complexity of the concept was 
assayed by measuring the ease with which it was acquired. 
Qualitative differences in performance were compared in terms 
of subjects' responses being more or less abstract or con­
crete or whether concepts were easier to solve when they in­
volved concrete objects, spatial forms, color or numerical
quantities,
Heldbreder (19^6a; 194&b; 19^8; 19^9) and her associates, 
(Heidbreder, Bensley, & Ivy, 19i|.8j Heldbreder & Overstreet, 19^8) 
exemplifying this method of ascertaining the relative difficulty 
of concepts, used in her early series of experiments (Heldbreder, 
1946a; 1946b; Heidbreder, Bensley, & Ivy, 1948; Heidbreder & 
Overstreet, 1948) an experimental procedure that was similar to 
the familiar memory situation. In fact, subjects were told that 
they were participating in a memory experiment. The stimulus 
materials were presented via memory drum and consisted of a 
series of drawings that could be classified into three cate­
gories such as concrete objects (e.g,, faces), spatial forms, 
and numerical quantities (e.g., drawings with two flowers, five 
spoons). The subjects were required to learn nonsense syllable 
names (e.g., Relk for faces) for the various categories of 
stimuli by the anticipation method. The findings indicated that 
concepts involving concrete objects were least difficult to 
attain, with spatial forms next, and numerical concepts most 
difficult.
In a later series of experiments Heldbreder (1948; 1949)# 
in attempting to reduce the role of memory and increase the 
role of perception, used a card sorting format where subjects 
could manually sort the drawings into their respective piles.
All materials were perceptually accessible for inspection 
throughout the experiment. The evidence indicated that under 
these "more perceptual" conditions, concepts were attained 
far more rapidly and far more easily in comparison to the
modified memory procedure. On the whole, Heidbreder found 
that sorting for number, as in the modified memory experiments, 
was most difficult, whereas sorting for concrete objects was 
easiest.
Grant and his associates (19i|-9; 1951» 1952), like Heid­
breder (19i|-6a; 19 4̂6b; I9I4-8 ; 191+9) and her associates (Heid­
breder, Bensley, & Ivy, 191+8; Heidbreder Sc Overstreet, 191+8), 
were interested in assaying the relative difficulty of clas­
sifying number, form, and color concepts. In Grant’s approach 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task was used, which consisted of a 
pack of 6I4. cards with geometrical designs that could be sorted 
for color, number, and form. Subjects were told simply whether 
their classifications were "right" or "wrong," In contrast to 
Heidbreder, Grant, Jones, and Tallantis (191+9) found was 
easier for subjects to sort for number than color and form. 
However, in subsequent experiments when Grant (1951) and Grant 
and Curran (1952) removed the constant configurational aspects 
of the number concept, the number concept became more difficult 
to classify, but not more difficult than the concept of form.
In 191+9 , when Underwood analyzed the experimental liter­
ature in concept learning, he pointed out some of the desired 
goals for the development of the area: (a) That more research­
ers concentrate on the theoretical aspects of conceptual 
behavior, (b) That tasks of various levels of complexity be 
developed and standardized to facilitate inter-laboratory 
communication.
In 1 9 5 5, Archer, (Underwood’s student). Bourne, and
Brown described a method based on information theory that would 
permit the experimenter to directly measure the amount of in­
formation contained in a concept, independently of the subject's 
response. The advantage of such a method is that the stimulus 
itself can be quantitatively assessed and functionally related 
to conceptual behavior. Archer, Bourne, end Brown (1955) and 
subsequently a number of other independent investigators 
(Battig & Bourne, 1961; Bourne, 1957; Bourne & Haygood, 1959; 
Bourne & Pendleton, 1956; Pishkin, I960; Pishkin & Wolfgang, 
196^; Wargo, I960; Wolfgang, Pishkin, & Lundy, 1962) have 
varied task complexity quantitatively by systematically increas­
ing the amount of irrelevant information along different binary 
stimulus dimensions (e,g,, color: red and blue; form: squares 
and triangles). The basic unit of measurable relevant and 
irrelevant information in information theory is a bit, which is 
defined as log2X, where x is the number of equally probable 
stimulus events. The general rule is that every time the num­
ber of alternatives is increased by a factor of two, one bit of 
information is added (Miller, 1953» Miller, 1956; Shannon & 
Weaver, 19l|9). The above experimenters clearly established that 
systematic increases in the amounts (bits) of irrelevant infor­
mation made the task progressively more complex and resulted 
in a predictable linear increase in the total number of errors. 
These consistent findings stem from studies that were not 
mere repetitions of each other; rather task complexity was 
often not the main variable, but an incidental one.
Research dealing with social dimensions and their influence
upon rstes of learning in concept identification has received 
little attention. Among the few who have investigated the social 
aspects of concept identification are Lydecker, Pishkin, and 
Martin (1961) and Pishkin (196 3 )0 These investigators studied 
the effects of social (experimenter delivered the feedback) ver­
sus mechanical feedback (lights were used to indicate the cor­
rectness of the response) upon chronic schizophrenics when 
solving concept identification problems, Lydecker, Pishkin, 
and Martin (1961) found that there was no difference in per­
formance between subjects receiving social feedback (experi­
menter said, "Right" or "Wrong") and those receiving mechan­
ical feedback. The explanation given for not finding any 
differences in the social and nonsocial conditions was that in 
the latter condition the experimenter continued to provide 
social cues. Although he was not in view of the subject, the 
experimenter remained in the room behind a partition while the 
subject was performing. When the above study was replicated 
by Pishkin (I9 6 3 ) and the experimenter was taken out of the 
experimental situation in the nonsocial condition, the subjects' 
(chronic schizophrenics) performance significantly improved 
over those operating in the social condition.
In a recent and more comprehensive study, Pishkin and 
Blanchard (I9 6 3 ) tested the effects of social cues on schizo­
phrenic and normal (psychiatric aides) populations. They man­
ipulated social cues by having stooges respond either with the 
correct answer 100% of the time or randomly, i,e., correct on
S0% of the trials. The main findings were that, although 
chronic schizophrenics and normals showed a decrement in con­
cept learning when the stooge responded randomly, the normal 
subjects showed a significantly greater decrement than schizo* 
phrenics. It seemed as though schizophrenics were better able 
to shut out the disruptive influence of the social cues pro­
vided by the stooge (a psychiatric aide dressed as a patient) 
than the normal subjects. In the condition where the stooge 
responded correctly on 100^ of the trials and subjects could 
solve the concept identification problem either by imitating 
the stooge or by using the relevant stimulus cues, concept 
learning was facilitated for both populations. In all three 
of the above studies, the experimenter or the stooge deliv­
ered reinforcement from a program; any type of social inter­
action was strictly prohibited.
In the present study the social dimension was the unre­
stricted interaction of a two-person group where subjects were 
permitted to freely communicate with each other. In this situ­
ation the subjects received not only mechanical information, 
but also relevant and irrelevant cues from their partners. In 
the two-person interaction setting, subjects had to learn to 
classify information in accordance with a relevant dimension 
and to arrive at a single decision before proceeding to the 
next trial, although they may have had different hypotheses 
concerning the correct response.
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Theoretical Approach to Concept Identification
In 1959» Bourne and Restle offered a comprehensive mathe­
matical model of concept identification. According to these 
theoreticians,learning In concept Identification involves two 
processes— conditioning to the relevant (rewarded) cues and 
adaptation to the Irrelevant (unrewarded) cues. It was assumed 
that rate of learning depended on the proportion of relevant 
cues and the probability that a cue was present at the time of 
reinforcement. The model has been successful In making accu­
rate predictions In terms of number of errors to solution for 
experimental variables. The most often verified prediction was 
that number of errors In concept Identification would Increase 
linearly with Increases In the number of Irrelevant dimensions 
from one to five, A possible source of Influence In concept 
learning which had been completely bypassed by the model, was 
social cues arising from individuals interacting without 
restriction.
One of the major alms of the present experiment was to 
account for the effects of social cues on concept Identifica­
tion performance In two-person groups In terms of the Bourne 
and Restle (1959) mathematical theory of concept identification 
and Its extensions which have recently been advanced by Pishkin 
and Blanchard (19&3) to Include so'cial parameters. Thus far, 
Pishkin and Blanchard (1963) have established the value of 
social cues In a situation where a stooge provided the social 
cues from a program and no further Interaction was permitted.
In the present experiment, the value of the social cue was
assessed In two situations. In one condition two subjects 
were free to exchange information about the relevant or irre­
levant aspects of the concept, and in the control group any com­
munication between subjects was prohibited beyond stating their 
individual classifications (A or B) of the stimulus materials. 
The equations to follow were used to compare the closeness 
of fit of theoretical estimates of learning rates {9) with ac­
tual obtained learning rates in terms of total number of er­
rors made by individual subjects and two-person groups. In 
addition, values of social cues for subjects operating under 
social conditions were established.
Bourne and Restle (1959) proposed that the learning rate 
{9) in solving concept identification (Cl) problems is deter­
mined by ^  r , where r is the proportion of relevant cues and 
^  is the proportion of trials on which a relevant cue is rein­
forced, In the present study relevant cues were reinforced 
100# of the time. The following equation developed by Bourne 
and Restle (1959) was used to account for theoretical 9 for 
the individual learner: ^ ^
R+X-h 6
In this equation, k is an unknown constant which determines the 
proportion of relevant cues utilized; R and I are the number 
of relevant and irrelevant dimensions which have been shown by 
Bourne and Restle (1959) to contribute equal amounts of cues,
B is an unknown constant which is the amount of residual or 
background irrelevant stimulation from apparatus, surround, and
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Internal ones.
To establish values for parameters k and B, simultaneous 
equations were used. Two estimates of  ̂ and its corresponding 
values were obtained from mean numbers of total errors pro­
duced by subjects solving concept identification problems with 
one and three irrelevant dimensions. These dimensions were 
chosen arbitrarily since any pair of dimensions (e.g., three 
and five irrelevant dimensions) could be used for estimating Ô • 
The two Û values were estimated from the Restle (1955) and 
Bourne and Restle (1959) equation which follows:
Ê- (;-a) loj n-a) ^
E is the mean number of errors made to criterion as a function
of the proportion of relevant cues and is obtained from the 
actual data in the experiment. Since equation 2 is not easily 
solved for 0 , Bourne and Restle (1959) have provided a nomo­
graph (p. 2 8 3) of the function where the two 6 values could be 
obtained from the total number of errors. Because Bourne and 
Restle*a (1959) nomograph provides only estimations of S , 
equation 2 was solved and exact Û values were obtained. After 
k and B parameters were evaluated from the two obtained values 
of 6 by use of simultaneous equations, then equation 1 was 
used^to predict total number of errors to solution of the re­
maining problem which contained five irrelevant dimensions.
In order to obtain predictions for subjects in conditions 
II and III where social parameters were involved, the equation 
developed by Pishkin and Blanchard (1963) within the Bourne 
and Restle (1959) framework was used. When both social and
11
stimulus cues are available and relevant, along with irrelevant 
concept identification stimulus cues, then:
e«*s.c.   3R+I -1-6+5
In this equation all parameters are described as those in equa­
tion 1, except for the additions of 1 and S to account for the 
value of social parameters in concept identification perfor­
mance, The 1 is the proportion of social cues utilized and S 
is an unknown constant and represents the overall value of the 
social cue, i.e., the one other person. The same procedure 
used to obtain d values for equation 1 were used in solving 
equation 3» Simultaneous equations were used to solve for the 
constants, social values, 1 end S. In looking at equations 1 
and 3 it can be noted that the numerators represent that por­
tion of the cues which are relevant and the denominators rep­
resent the total amount of cues available to the subjects when 
solving concept identification problems.
Since theoreticians and experimenters have treated concept 
learning mainly as a solitary activity, it was necessary to 
refer to the area of group problem solving for information on 
how group interaction might effect concept learning.
Individual versus Group Problem Solving 
The reviews of research on problem solving in social situ­
ations (Collins & Guetzkow, 196^, pp. 13-^5» Kelly & Thibaut, 
19^4, pp. 735-785; Lorge, Pox, Davitz, & Brenner, 1958; Rose- 
borough, 1953) indicate that over the past three decades the 
literature has been extensive. The common finding was that
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groups (I.e., an Interacting face-to-face group where discus­
sion was permitted) outperformed individuals working alone on 
such tasks as jigsaw puzzles, mathematical puzzles, word puz­
zles, anagrams, limerick completion, mazes, riddles, and syl­
logisms (Barnlund, 1959; Davis & Restle, 1963; Faust, 1959; 
Gurnee, 1939; Hoppe, 1962; Husband, I9I4.O; Lorge & Solomon, 1955; 
Marquant, 1955; Perlmutter & DeMontmollin, 1952; Restle & Davis, 
1 9 6 2; Shaw, 1952; Sperow, I9 6I; Taylor & Faust, 1952; Thorndike, 
1 9 3 8)• In addition to the many studies analyzing the compara­
tive abilities of groups and individuals in problem solving 
there have been several investigations dealing with the ques­
tion of whether there are any differences between group mem­
ory and individual memory. The results of several studies 
(Hoppe, 1 9 6 2; Perlmutter & DeMontmollin, 1952; Yuker, 1955) 
were consistent in their finding that groups were superior 
to individuals in their ability to recall or remember infor­
mation accurately.
The experimental literature concerning problem solving in 
interpersonal situations where groups were compared to indivi­
duals indicated certain trends: (a) There have been practically
no attempts made to systematically evaluate the relative com­
plexity of the problems introduced or to study problem solving 
performance of groups versus individuals under varying degrees 
of task complexity, (b) Performance on a problem was commonly 
summarized by the median or mean time to solution or by the 
proportion of subjects who successfully reached solution,
(c) Subjects were usually not given any feedback on their
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progress toward solution, (d) Little attention was given to the 
process of group interaction and its possible effects on problem 
solution. In the present experiment the complexity of the 
problem was quantified by systematically varying the amount of 
irrelevant information, and feedback was given on each trial 
informing the subjects on the correctness or incorrectness of 
their responses.
In view of the results of the previously mentioned litera­
ture on group problem solving (e, g,, Barnlund, 1959; Davis & 
Restle, 1963; Faust, 1959; Hoppe, 1962; Lorge, Fox, Davitz, & 
Brenner, 1958; Restle & Devis, 1962; Shaw, 1952; Sperow, 1961; 
Taylor & Faust, 1952) where groups of various sizes (2 to ^ 
subjects) have, in the large majority of instances, outper­
formed individuals working alone in solving puzzle tasks pre­
dominantly, it appears that more relevant cues were being pro­
duced in the social setting where subjects could have the 
benefit of testing out with each other their hypotheses or 
ideas before making a decision about the correct solution. It 
was expected in the present study that social cues that arose 
when two subjects were free to discuss and exchange information 
about the relevant and irrelevant aspects of the concept, as 
well as to share two memories stored with past and present 
information, would produce an additional supply of relevant 
information and result in groups making fewer errors when 
solving concept identification problems of different levels 
of complexity than individuals who had only the benefit of 
mechanical stimulus cues.
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The last major consideration of the present experiment 
was to evaluate the possible effects of the social interaction 
process on concept attainment which has been bypassed in con­
cept learning and group problem solving studies. Thus, in 
addition to measuring subjects* performance in the traditional 
way, i.e., the number of errors to criterion and time to 
solution, measures of latency of response, initiator of conver­
sation, talk time, exchanges of conversation (sequential utter­
ances), and whose decision was initiated and finally adopted 
were obtained and evaluated in their relationship to concept 
identification performance. Similar measures of social inter­
action proved to be useful when evaluating the conditioning of 
decision-making behavior of a two-person group in a free social 
interaction setting as a function of positive and negative re­
inforcement (Wolfgang, Banta, & Pishkin, 196^), Overall, one 
of the most significant findings was that although subjects on 
negative reinforcement were the least successful in getting 
their decisions adopted, they consistently talked longer, initi­
ated conversation on each trial more frequently and responded 
with the shortest latencies of speech across all blocks of trials 
when compared to subjects on positive reinforcement. Due to 
the limited backlog of information the relationship between 
concept identification performance and social interaction 
measures could be only exploratory at this time.
Summary, Learning theorists and learning researchers, 
including those in concept identification, treat human and 
animal learning as though it were a solitary activity.
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although, much of learning occurs in a group situation where 
information is shared and discussed. Research on the social 
aspects of concept learning where individuals are free to 
communicate and exchange information with each other has been 
practically nonexistent. It was the overall purpose of the 
present study to investigate the effects of social cues in a 
free social interaction setting on rates of learning concept 
identification problems of varied degrees of complexity and to 
compare these rates with those of the single learner and with 
those of groups (controls) where social interaction was re­
stricted.
The findings of a large number of investigators in the 
area of group problem solving suggest that on problem solving 
tasks (e.g., mathematical puzzles, word puzzles, riddles, and 
syllogisms) groups of two to four subjects were superior to 
individuals working alone. There was also evidence that sug­
gests that groups more accurately recall and retain information 
than the individual learner. On the basis of these findings 
it was proposed that two-man groups, free to exchange infor­
mation in a free social interaction setting and having two 
memories to process past and present information feedback 
would produce more relevant cues and result in groups making 
fewer errors when solving concept identification problems of 
different levels of complexity than individuals working alone 
and two-man groups where communication was restricted.
The relationship between concept identification perform-
16
ance and social interaction measures was an exploratory under­
taking since the literature in concept identification was 
barren in this subject. In addition to measuring subjects* 
performance in the traditional manner, i.e., number of errors 
and time to solution, a quantitative analysis was made of the 
social interaction process. Measures of sequential utterances 
(exchanges of conversation), latency of speech, talk time, 
initiator of conversation, and whose decision was initiated and 
finally adopted were obtained and evaluated for their relation­
ship to concept identification performance. Such an analysis 
of social interaction was bypassed in concept learning and 
problem solving studies.
One of the major aims of this research was to account for 
the effects of social cues on learning rates within the frame­
work of the mathematical model of concept identification de­
veloped by Bourne and Restle (1959) and extended by Pishkin and 
Blanchard (I9 6 3) to include social parameters. In the present 
experiment the theoretical values of social cues were estab­
lished in a free social interaction setting and in a setting 
where interaction was restricted. Theoretical prediction of 
learning rates for two-man groups as well as for individuals 
were compared with the empirically obtained learning rates.
It was anticipated that learning rates would be slower for 
individuals working alone than for two-man groups free to 





The subjects were 123 male volunteer students in elemen­
tary psychology courses, who were randomly divided into nine 
treatment groups that were replicated eight times. Subjects 
in the two-man groups who acknowledged that they were friends 
were excluded from participating with each other.
Design
A 3 X 3 factorial design was used, which included three 
levels of complexity (1, 3» or 5 irrelevant dimensions) over 
192 trials and three interaction levels with one or two sub­
jects operating in one of three conditions. In Condition I 
subjects performed alone; in Condition II subjects in two-per­
son groups were free to interact socially and exchange infor­
mation in their attempts to identify the relevant dimensions 
in the concept; and lastly. Condition III was a control group 
composed of two persons, where any kind of social interaction 
was prohibited beyond the subjects simply verbally stating 
their individual responses, i.e., A or B, in classifying the 
stimulus patterns. The dependent variables in each of the
17
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three conditions is depicted in Table 1.
Table 1
Dependent Variables for Each Condition
Condition I Condition II Condition III




Number of Errors Number of Errors Number of Errors
Time to Solution Time to Solution Time to Solution
Latency of Speech 
Utterances
Latency of Speech 
Utterances











Task and Apparatus 
The subject's task was to categorize a series of geo­
metric patterns flashed on the screen in accordance with a 
relevant dimension. For example, if color was the relevant 
dimension, the solution was to press key A when the pattern 
was red and key B when the pattern was green.
The patterns were projected on a 12-in. x 8-in. milk glass 
screen by a Dunning Animatic strip film projector. The screen, 
stationed at the subject’s eye level, was surrounded by a solid 
black wooden border which allowed the subject to view only the 
geometric patterns on the screen. Just below the screen there 
was a panel with two response keys positioned horizontally and 
two amber feedback lights just above the response keys. The 
two response keys were identified by the letters A and B lo­
cated above the left and right feedback lights, respectively.
The experimenter's panel board was electronically con­
nected to the subject's panel and contained in an identical 
manner two response keys identified by the letters A and B 
and two feedback lights, but the panel boards differed in func­
tion. When the subject pressed a key the experimenter's panel 
light indicated the subject's choice of response; then the 
experimenter, using a planned program of information feedback 
coordinated with the filmstrip programming, depressed a key 
which lit up one of the feedback lights on the subject's panel 
for approximately one second, indicating to the subject the 
correctness of his response. The Esterline Angus 20-pen 
operations recorder was electronically connected to both the
20
experimenter's and subject’s panel board to record the subject's 
response and the experimenter's feedback.
The Esterline Angus recorder was also connected to two mi­
crophones (one for each subject In the two-person group) In con­
junction with two voice operated relays which, when activated, 
automatically recorded each subject's frequency and duration of 
speech. In order to channel the subject's speech utterances 
so that he activated only his own voice-operated relay the micro­
phone was embedded In a conical soundproof shield which ex­
tended upward just beyond the subject's mouth. The experiment­
er's panel board contained. In addition to the two response 
keys Identified by letters A and B and two feedback lights, 
two buttons representing subject 1 and subject 2, and when 
appropriately depressed they Indicated on the Esterline Angus 
whose decision was Initiated and finally adopted.
An electronic timer was set to automatically advance the 
filmstrip (stimulus pattern) to a blank frame, then to the 
next geometric pattern within seconds after the onset of 
the experimenter's feedback, allowing the subject to start an­
other trial after his last response.
To reduce background noise from the apparatus and surround, 
a wooden cubicle lined with soundproof tiles was constructed.
The three paneled cubicle with a top and two sides was 6 3” high, 
36" from front to back,and 1|.8" In width. It was roomy enough 
so that one or two subjects could be comfortably seated Inside, 
The cubicle was arranged so that the subjects could clearly 




At the start of each session, the subjects in the social 
conditions were seated inside the soundproof cubicle in front 
of the screen, each having access to the response keys. Then 
the subjects' chest microphones were adjusted so that they 
were directly in front of the subjects' mouths. The subjects 
were instructed to try to speak into the microphone and avoid 
talking in either a very loud or a very soft voice. The sub­
jects were told about the nature of the task, the significance 
of the response keys and feedback lights, as well as how to 
manipulate the controls. The instructions for individuals and 
subjects in two-person groups were essentially the same (see 
Appendix A) except that the subjects in the free interaction 
group (Condition II) were told that they were to arrive at a 
single decision and only one decision could be registered per 
trial, whereas the subjects in the noninteracting control 
group (Condition III) were told to simply state their indivi­
dual decisions verbally and register them by depressing one 
of the two response keys on each trial.
In solving the two-choice discrimination problem, the 
subject was to match a relevant dimension with one or the 
other of the two response keys. The relevant dimensions of 
the two problem types were form and number. The relevant 
dimension is that property of the pattern, which, when iden­
tified by the subject, enabled him to press the appropriate
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key or state the appropriate hypothesis for a correct solution. 
Each problem type was elaborated into three levels of complex­
ity (1, 3, or 5 irrelevant dimensions). An irrelevant dimen­
sion had a zero correlation with the correct response. For in­
stance, where the relevant dimension was form, the subject 
would press the key A in response to a square, and key B in 
response to a triangle and be correct. If, however, the sub­
ject responded to the irrelevant dimensions such as color 
(red or green), or to the position (middle or bottom of the 
screen), or orientation (the upright or tilted figure), then 
his responses were correct only at chance level. When a di­
mension was held constant throughout the sequence of stimu­
lus patterns, it was considered neither relevant nor irrele­
vant.
The criterion of concept solution was 16 consecutive 
correct responses. However, if criterion was not reached, 
then subjects were given a total of 192 trials. In the group 
condition when subjects concluded their performance they were 
instructed to individually write the solution to the prob­
lem on a slip of paper so that the experimenter could deter­
mine whether both subjects arrived at solution.
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
Upon inspection of the data, it was noted that variance 
differences between subjects in the free interaction (PI) con­
dition and those in the restricted interaction (RI) and indi­
vidual (I) conditions were quite large for both error and time 
scores, Cochran’s test of homogeneity (Winer, 1962, p.94) 
revealed that for time (£ = .44, df = 7, E <,01) and error 
scores (£ = ,4 2 , df = 7, £<«01) there was significant hetero­
geneity, A number of psychologists and statisticians (Boneau, 
I960; Box, 1953» Box, 1954» Edwards, 1962, p. 132; Lindquist, 
1956, p. 86; Norton, 1956, pp. 78-88; Winer, 1962, p, 33) 
have generally concluded, in view of considerable evidence, that 
the t and F tests of analysis of variance are robust tests, 
insensitive to nonnormality and to heterogeneity of variance 
(when N ’s are equal). For example, Lindquist concluded, "In 
general, unless heterogeneity of either form or variance is so 
extreme as to be readily apparent upon inspection of the data, 
the effect upon the F distribution will probably be negligible" 
(1956, p, 86), Due to the marked heterogeneity (the difference 
between the largest and smallest variance was over 100), a log 
transformation upon error and time scores was performed.
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The log transformation resulted In homogeneity of variance for 
both the error (C = *26, ^  = 7» £ > *01) and time scores 
(C = ,2k, df = 7, £ 7 .01).
Analysis of Error Scores 
To determine whether subjects in the PI condition would 
be superior to subjects in the I and RI conditions in learn­
ing to solve concept identification (Cl) problems a series of 
analyses were performed.
An analysis of variance on error scores disclosed that the 
main effects of interaction levels and complexity were signifi­
cant.
Table 2
Analysis of Variance of Log Errors
Source MS F
Interaction Levels (IL) 2 4.);479 27,12*
Complexity (C) 2 1.7053 1 0 ,4 0*
Linear 1 3.2784 19,99*
Quadratic 1 ,1321 ,80
IL X C k .2116 1,29
Within 63 .1640
^Significant at ,001 level.
2^
Figure 1 shows that the greatest mean number of errors was 
produced In the RI condition (29.75)» the lowest, in the PI 
condition (2,29). Subjects* performance in the I condition 
(1 3 .5 0 ) fell in between, Duncan*s (1955) new multiple range 
test revealed, as expected, that the subjects' performance in 
the PI condition was superior to the learner in the I condi­
tion ( ^  = 6 3 , £<,005) and to those in the RI condition ( ^  = 
6 3 » £<.001). And subjects in the I condition made signi­
ficantly fewer errors than those in the RI condition ( ^  =
6 3, £<,001), The learning curves for subjects in each inter­
action level under each level of complexity are presented in 
Figures 2, 3, and Ij., These figures reveal that subjects in 
the FI condition consistently outperformed subjects in the I 
condition and the RI condition across all blocks of trials and 
under all levels of complexity. As the problem became more 
complex, subjects' performance in the I and RI condition grew 
progressively worse; whereas performance in the FI condition 
showed only a slight change. It appeared that the subjects 
in the FI condition could have solved Cl problems which con­
tained a greater amount of irrelevant information.
To determine whether pairs of subjects in the PI condi­
tion outperformed pairs of subjects in the RI condition and 
single learners on 01 problems of different levels of com­
plexity, a series of _t tests were performed (Table 3).
A graphic representation of mean errors between interaction 
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Table 3
Summary of _t Tests between Each. Interaction Level at Each 
Level of Complexity (1, 3, and $ Irrelevant Bits 
Of Information) for Transformed Error Scores
Interaction®
Levels
Complexity t Values 
163 df) R
PI vs. I 1 .48 One-tailedTests
3 1.56
5 3.70 .001




PI vs. RI 1 3.33 .01 One-tailedTests
3 4.90 .001
5 4.62 .001












Irrelevant Bits of Information
Pig, 5» Mean errors as a function of irrelevant bits of informa­
tion. The parameter is interaction levels, (Each point represents 
an N of 8.)
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Although subjects In the PI condition produced fewer errors 
than those in the I condition along all levels of complexity. 
Table 3 discloses that significance was reached only at the 
highest level of complexity <.001). In contrast, subjects 
in the PI condition showed superior performance to those in 
the RI condition along all levels of complexity (Table 3),
When subjects in the I condition were compared to those in the 
RI condition, results indicated that individual performers made 
significantly fewer errors along two levels of task complexity 
(1 and 3 irrelevant bits), but not at the highest level (5 
irrelevant bits). Thus the data indicate that pairs of sub­
jects freely interacting outperformed subjects whose inter­
action was restricted along all levels of complexity, and PI 
subjects showed clear superiority to the single learner on 
Cl problems with the highest level of complexity.
The significance of the main effect of complexity showed, 
as does Figure 6, that as the amount of irrelevant informa­
tion increased, mean errors progressively increased. The mean 
number of errors for concepts containing 1, 3> or 5 irrele­
vant bits of information were 12.12, and 2 8 ,6 6  respec­
tively, An orthogonal polynomial analysis was performed for 
complexity (Table 2) and only the linear component reached 
significance (£<,001), The significance of complexity was con­
sistent with the results obtained by several previous Cl inves­
tigators (e,g,. Archer, Bourne, & Brown, 195#; Bourne, 1957» 
Pishkin, I960; Pishkin & Wolfgang, 196^; Wolfgang, Pishkin, & 
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revealed that there were significant differences in mean er­
rors between complexity levels 1 and 5 (df = 6 3 , £ <  .001),
3 and 5 (j^ = 6 3 , £<T.01), but not between 1 and 3 = 6 3»
£ >.05).
To analyze the subjects' performance on problems with 
increasing levels of complexity within each interaction level, 
a aeries of t tests were performed (Table k  )• Changes in 
mean errors with increasing levels of complexity within each 
interaction level is illustrated in Figure 5. The Jb tests in 
Table disclosed that subjects in the PI condition showed no 
significant difference in performance between problems con­
taining 1 and 3» 1 and 5. and 3 and 5 irrelevant bits of infor­
mation (£>*05), In the RI condition there was a significant 
difference in errors between problems containing 1 and 5 irre­
levant bits of information (£<*01), but subjects showed no 
significant difference in performance between problems with 1 
and 3 $ and with 3 and 5 irrelevant bits (£>,05). Lastly, in 
the I condition subjects showed a significant difference in 
performance between problems with 1 and 5 (£<.001) and with 
3 and 5 bits of irrelevant information (£ <,01) but found 
problems containing 1 and 3 irrelevant bits of information to 
be of similar difficulty ( £ > . 0 5 ).
Since the two subjects in the RI condition responded 
separately and registered independent decision», it was pos­
sible to assess not only the group score, but also each sub­
ject's performance. The finding, using jt tests (direct-dif- 
ference method). was that subjects first to reach solution
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Table
Stunmary of t Tests between Levels of Complexity 
Within Each Interaction Level for Log Errors
Interaction
Levels
Complexity t Values 
“ (63 df) 
One-tailed Test
Pree
Interaction 1 vs. 3 .03
1 vs. 5 1,23
3 vs. 5 1,26
Restricted 1 vs. 3 1.54Interaction
1 vs. S 2,51 .01
3 vs, 5 .97
Individuals 1 vs. 3 1.05
1 vs. 5 4.44 ,001
3 vs, 5 3.40 ,01
(fast learners) made significantly fewer errors than their 
partners (slow learners) (t = 3*59, ^  = 23, £<C^»01)o Thus two 
types of learners could be differentiated in the RI condition 
and will hereafter be referred to as fast and slow learners. 
Overall mean errors for fast learners were 11,20, and 2i{.,$i{. for 
for slow learners. Past learners made fewer meen errors over 
all levels of task complexity than slow learners. Mean errors 
for fast learners* solving problems with 1, 3, and 5 bits of
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irrelevant information were 5 .7 5# 1 2,0 0, and 1 5 *6? respectively; 
and for slow learners 8,50, 25.00, and ^0,12, The t tests be­
tween fast and slow learners' performance indicated that there 
were significant differences on problems containing 3 (Jt = 2 ,8 8, 
df = 7, £C.05) and 5 (t = 2,67, df = 7 , jgc,05) irrelevant 
bits of information. Significance was not reached on problems 
containing 1 irrelevant bit (t = ,8 9, df = 7, £ 7 ,0 5 ),
In addition to error scores, measures of decisions initi­
ated and latency of speech in seconds were obtained. The num­
ber of times the fast or slow learner was the initiator of de­
cisions (A or B) was totalled. The results showed that fast 
learners initiated significantly more decisions toward the cor­
rect solution than slow learners (_t = 2 .1 0 , df = 7, £ <  *0 5), 
Overall mean number of decisions initiated was 57.62 for fast 
learners and 27.17 for slow learners. Comparisons were made 
between fast and slow learners for mean number of decisions 
initiated at each level of complexity; there was no signifi­
cant difference in mean number of decisions initiated for prob­
lems containing 1 (t = ,39, df = 7 , jg >,05) end 5 ( 1  = ,99, 
df = 7, £ >.05) bits of irrelevant information, but signifi­
cance was reached for problems containing 3 irrelevant bits
(t = 2 ,8 9, df = 7, £<.05).
For both fast and slow learners measures of latency of 
speech were obtained. Latency was defined as the time in sec­
onds that elapsed between the end of the trial, when the 
experimenter gave the feedback, and the pronouncement of each
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subject's decision, A or B, For problems with 3 Çt = 2.37, 
df = 7, J2<c05) and $ (t = 2.69, df = 7, o05) irrelevant
bits, speech latency was shorter for slow learners than for 
fast learners; on problems with 1 irrelevant bit no differences 
were found = 1,08, df = 7, £ >* 0 5 )o
Checks were made to ascertain to what extent solutions were 
independently arrived at, (i.e., did the slower learner mimic 
the answers of the faster learner to achieve solution?) The 
experimenter required that each subject independently write 
his solution to the problem after criterion was reached (i.e., 
when both subjects had made 16 consecutive correct responses).
In four instances or 16% of the time slow learners were unable 
to state the solution to the problem, indicating that a pro­
portion of the relevant social cues provided by the fast 
learner were being utilized by the slow learner.
To compare the fast learners* performance in the RI con­
dition with that of the subjects in the FI condition, _t tests 
were performed. Subjects free to interact made significantly 
fewer errors than fast learners in the RI condition (t = 3,27, 
df = 1̂.6, £C,01), Overall mean errors were 2.29 for subjects 
free to interact and 11.20 for fast learners in the RI condi­
tion, a ratio of about 5 to 1 in favor of subjects in the FI 
condition. Further analysis with t tests indicated that sub­
jects in the FI condition made significantly fewer errors than 
fast learners on problems containing 1 (_t = 2.16, ^  = Dj., £<.05) 
and 3 (t = 2.21, ^  = lî., £ <.05) bits of irrelevant informa­
tion, but on problems containing 5 irrelevant bits significance
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was approached but not reached (jt = 1.89, ^  p = *10).
Mean errors for problems with 1, 3, and 5 irrelevant bits were 
for fast learners 5*75, 12.00, and 15.87 respectively and for 
subjects in the PI condition, 1.25, 1.25, and i;.37.
To determine whether fast learners in the RI condition 
were superior to individuals working alone, a series of ^ tests 
were performed. Results indicated that there was no difference 
in errors between fast learners end individual learners (_t = .39, 
df = 46, £ 7.05). Overall mean errors for fast learners were 
11,50, for subjects in the I condition, 13.50, Also, t tests 
revealed no significant differences in performance between fast 
learners in the RI condition and subjects in the I condition 
on problems with 1 (t = 1,62, ^  = 14, £ = ,10), 3(_t = 1,43» 
df = 1 4, £7.05), and 5 (t = 1,25, df = 1 4 , £"7,05) irrelevant 
bits. Mean errors produced were 5.75, 12,00, and 15.87 respec­
tively for fast learners on problems with 1, 3, and 5 irrele­
vant bits, and 1,87, 4.82, and 34,00 for subjects in the I con­
dition.
To check out the possibility of subjects' seating positions 
(i.e., subjects seated on the left were closer to the left but­
ton and subjects on the right were closer to the right button) 
influencing errors made on the left and right buttons in the 
RI condition, a series of t tests were performed (Table 5).
There were no significant differences in errors made by sub­
jects seated on the left, on the right and left buttons along 
all levels of complexity (£7,05). Subjects seated on the 
right showed no significant differences in errors on the left
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Table 5
Summary of jb Tests for Errors on the Left vs. Right Response 
Button as a Function of Seating Position 






Subjects 1 1,36on the Left 3 0.00
5 1.66
Subjects 1 2.4Z*on the Right 3 .5k
5 .ko
*Significant at .0$ level,
or right button for problems containing 3 snd 5 irrelevant bits 
of information (£>#05)» but made significantly more errors on 
the right button when the problem contained one irrelevant 
bit = 2.5̂ 1-» df = 7, £<*05)« In comparing overall errors 
made by subjects seated on the left and right a t test revealed 
that there was no significant difference in performance as a 
function of seating position {t = .66, = 23, £>,05)* Thus,
the data indicate that subjects' seating position in the RI 
condition had a negligible effect on 01 performance.
Analysis of Time Scores 
An analysis of variance of mean log time to solution, pre­
sented in Table 6, revealed significant main effects for inter­
action levels and complexity. Subsequent analysis of inter-
i|0  
Table 6
Analysis of Variance of Transformed Time Scores
Source MS F
Interaction Levels (IL) 2 1 .2 0 1 7 18.54*
Complexity (C) 2 .9796 1 5 .12*
Linear 1 1 .9 5 1 0 3 0.11*
Quadratic 1 ,0 0 8 3 .1 3
IL X C k ,0 8 9 8 1 .3 8
Within 63 ,0614.8
^Significant at ,001 level.
action levels with Duncan's test (1955) indicated, as does 
Pig, 7» that there were insignificant differences in time to 
solution between subjects in the PI and I conditions - 63, 
£ > o05)o However, there were significant differences in per­
formance between subjects in the PI and RI condition = 63>
2 < *001) and between subjects in the I and RI condition =
6 3, £<»001), with the subjects in the RI condition taking 
longer to reach solution. Mean times to solution in minutes 
for subjects in the PI, RI, and I conditions were 6.^2, 17.50, 
and 8 ,1 6  respectively.
To assess the differences in time to solution between inter­




Flp. 7. Mean time to solution as a function of interaction levels. 




Summary of t Tests between Each Interaction Level 
WlThln Each Level of Complexity 








“ (63 df) 
Two-tailed Tests
R
FI vs. I 1 1.15
3 .05
5 1.^0
RI vs, I 1 3.23 .01
3 4.08 .001
5 1,68
RI vs. FI 1 2.08 .05
3 4.14 .001
5 3.08 .01
®PI = Free Interaction, RI = Restricted Interaction,
I = Individuals,
The results showed, as does Fig, 8, that subjects in the RI 
condition take longer to reach solution than subjects in the 
FI condition on problems containing 1 (£<,05), 3 (£<«001), 
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^^6* Mean tine to solution in n^nutaa as a function of irrelevant bits 
of information. The parameter is Interaction levels. (Each point represents 
an N of o*)
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insignificant differences in time were found between subjects 
in the PI and I condition along all levels of task complexity 
Subjects in the RI condition, when compared with 
those in the I condition, took significantly longer to reach 
solution on problems containing 1 (£<;.0l), 3 (g <.00l) irre­
levant bits of information, but significance was only approach­
ed on problems containing 5 irrelevant bits = ,10),
The significant main effect of complexity (Table 6) indi­
cated that differences among mean times to solution were a 
function of the amount of irrelevant information. As Fig, 9 
shows, time to solution increased as the amount of irrelevant 
information increased from one to five irrelevant bits. The 
results of an orthogonal polynomial analysis of complexity re­
vealed that only the linear component was significant (£<,001), 
Thus, increases were found for both time and error scores as a 
function of increases in irrelevant information, Pearson's 
product-moment correlations between errors and time to solution 
showed a significant positive correlation for problems with 1 
(r = ,82, ^  = 22, £ < , 0 0 5 ), 3 (r = ,86, ^  = 22, £<,005), and 
5 irrelevant bits of information (r = ,93, ^  = 22, £<,005)* 
These findings are consistent with the results of Archer, Bourne, 
and Brown (1955) and Bourne (1957),
Subsequent analyses of complexity with Duncan's test 
(1955) indicated, when comparisons were made between perfor­
mances on problems with 1 and 5 ( ^  = 6 3, £  <.001) and 3 and 
5 (dX = 6 3 , £ < , 0 0 5 ) bits of irrelevant information, that sub­
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Pig. 9. Mean time to solution in minutes as a function of irrelevant 
bits of information. (Each point represents an N of 21;.)
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complex problems (5 irrelevant bits). No differences in time 
were found between problems with 1 and 3 Irrelevant bits = 
6 3» £>*05)« Mean times to solution in minutes for problems 
with 1, 3> and 5 bits of irrelevant information were S.58,
9.75, and 16.79 respectively.
To assess differences in solution time for problems of 
increasing levels of complexity within each interaction level, 
t tests were performed (Table 8). In the PI condition there 
was no difference in time to solution between problems with 1 
and 3 (£>»05) bits of irrelevant information. Between prob­
lems with 1 and 5 (£<*05) and 3 and 5 irrelevant bits (£<.05), 
subjects took significantly longer to reach solution with 5 ir­
relevant bits.
In the RI condition an analysis of time to solution was 
performed between fast and slow learners. Overall, fast learn­
ers solved Cl problems quicker than slow learners (t = 4*09, 
df = 2 3, £ <  .001). For fast learners overall mean time to 
solution was 9.75, and for slow learners, 17*45* Across all 
levels of task complexity, 1 (t = 2.&4, df = 7, £ < *05); 3
(t = 3 *0 5, df = 7, £<.02); and 5 (t = 3*03, df = 7, £<*02) 
irrelevant bits, fast learners solved Cl problems quicker than 
slow learners. Mean times to solution in minutes for problems 
with 1, 3, and 5 bits of irrelevant information were 6.62,
11.12, and 11.50 respectively for fast learners and 9.00, 10,37, 
and 2 5 ,0 0 for slow learners.
In comparing fast learners in the RI condition with sub­
jects in the PI condition, the overall mean time to solution
kl
Table 8
Summary of t Tests between Each Level of Complexity 












Interaction 1 vs. 3 .3 2
1 vs. 5 1 .9 8 .0 5
3 vs. 5 1 .6 7 .0 5
Restricted 1 vs. 3 2 ,3 8 .0 5Interaction
1 vs. 5 2,99 .01
3 vs. 5 .61
Individuals 1 vs. 3 1.53
1 vs. 5 k.Sk .001
3 vs. 5 3.01 .01
in minutes for the former was 9*75 end for the latter, 6 ,14.2 ,
A significant difference in solution time was approached but 
not reached (t = 1,97» df = I4.6 , £ = ,06), When fast learners 
were compared to subjects in the FI condition across all levels 
of task complexity, no significant differences in time to solu­
tion were found for problems with 1 (t = 1,75» df = li|., £ >, 0 5 )
k s
and 5 (^ = .56, ^  = li*., £  >.05) irrelevant bits. For prob­
lems containing 3 irrelevant bits, significance was approached 
(i = 2,11, ^  = lij., £ = ,06), Mean times to solution for prob­
lems containing 1, 3, and 5 irrelevant bits of information for 
subjects in the PI condition were ^,62, 5.12, and 9,50 respec­
tively.
Lastly, when fast learners were compared to subjects in the 
I condition in time to solution, no significant differences were 
found (t = ,71, ^  = i(.6, £■>,05). Subjects in the I condition 
had an overall mean time to solution of 8,16; the fast learners* 
time was 9.75.
Analysis of Verbal Interaction Measures 
In the FÏ Condition
In addition to time and error scores, measures of verbal 
interaction (talk time, sequential utterances, latency of 
speech, decisions initiated and adopted, and initiator of dis­
cussion) were analyzed for the FI condition. In this condi­
tion subjects were free to discuss their hypotheses about the 
correct response before coming to a common decision on each 
trial. In view of the insignificant differences found between 
partners in talk time and latency of speech (see Appendix C), 
their scores were combined for the analyses to follow.
To determine whether there were significant differences 
in verbal activity between levels of task complexity, an ana­
lysis of variance was performed on sequential utterances 
(Table 9), talk time (Table 10), and latency of speech (Table 
11), The number of sequential utterances, amount of talk
k-9
Table 9
Analysis of Variance for Sequential Utterances
Source MS P
Complexity 2 27,950.37 1.48
Within 21 18,857.14
Table 10
Analysis of Variance for Talk Time (Secs.)
Source df MS P
Complexity 2 25,800.79 1.55
Within 21 16,660.68
Table 11
Analysis of Variance for Latency of Speech (Secs.)
Source df MS
Complexity 2 2i|.,069.12 2.^5
Within 21 9,810.18
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time, and speech latency of each pair of subjects were ana­
lyzed, A sequential utterance is an exchange of conversation, 
i.e., one subject*s utterance followed by his partner's con­
stituted two sequential utterances. Tables 9, 10, and 11 show 
insignificant main effects for complexity (£'7,05)*
Subsequent analysis with Duncan* s test revealed that sub­
jects* talk time, number of sequential utterances, and latency 
of speech did not show any significant changes between prob­
lems with 1 and 3 (df = 21, £ > , 0 5 ), 1 and 5 = 21, £  >*05)>
and 3 and 5 bits of irrelevant information (df = 21, £'>,05). 
Table 12 contains means for talk time, latency of speech, se­
quential utterances, and errors for each level of complexity. 
Note in Table 12 that changes in verbal activity are similar 
to changes in errors along each level of complexity, Pearson 
r*s showed significant positive correlations between errors 
and talk time (r = ,93» ^  = 22, £<,005)» errors and latency 
(r = ,88, ^  = 22, £ < « 0 0 5), and errors and sequential utter­
ances (r = .94» “ 22, £<,005), Thus, in the PI condition
verbal activity was positively related to errors in concept 
identification performance but not to task complexity.
Unexpectedly, subjects who initiated a decision got it 
adopted 99,5^ of the time, indicating that disagreements about 
the correct response were at a minimum.
Tables with mean scores for all dependent variables in 
their respective treatment conditions are located in Appendix 




Means of Errors, Sequential Utterances, Talk Time 
And Latency of Speech in the 
Free Interaction Condition
Bits of Irrelevant Information
1 3 5
Mean errors 1.25 1.25 4.37
Sequential
utterances 69.25 68.25 171.12
Talk time 
in seconds 68.25 78,00 171.12
Latency of speech 
in seconds 185.37 196.25 285.50
Note.-Each mean is based on 8 two-person groups.
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Extended Mathematical Theory of Concept Identification 
A snmmary of the obtained and predicted learning rates (Û), 
obtained and predicted errors for each level of task complexity, 
and the values of the constants for subjects In the I, PI, and 
RI conditions Is presented In Table 13* Subjects In the PI con­
dition consistently obtained higher 0 values (computed from 
equation 2), Indicating faster rates of concept learning than 
subjects In the RI and I conditions at all levels of complexity. 
When comparing obtained mean errors of the subjects In the PI 
condition with those In the I condition on the simplest Cl prob­
lems (1 Irrelevant bit), error scores were similar, but as the 
complexity of the concept Increased, differences became more 
pronounced. Individuals made 3k times as many errors on con­
cepts with 3 Irrelevant bits and about 8 times as many errors 
on the most complex conceptual problems (5 Irrelevant bits).
The differences In obtained errors In Cl between subjects In 
the PI condition and those In the RI are more pronounced, par­
ticularly with slow learners.
One of the main predictions of the Cl model Is that as 
the amount of Irrelevant Information Increases, learning rate 
id) should decrease. This prediction was verified In the I 
and RI conditions, but In the PI condition the prediction was 
not confirmed. Table 13 shows that the obtained 6 's and 
errors for problems with 1 and 3 Irrelevant bits were Identi­
cal In the PI condition. Thus, the basic assumption of the 
model that Increasing the number of Irrelevant cues would 
retard learning did not hold up In a setting where two subjects
Table 13
Summary of Values of Constants, Obtained and Predicted 9s and Mean Errors 
As a Function of Interaction Levels and Number 













1 .#0 1.25 K= .8 8 1PI 3 .279 •kko 2.71 1.25 B= .516
5 • • • e .205 U.37 S=1= .97U.671
RI 1 • • • • .132 8.50 K= .6 8 1Slow 3 e # # # .059 2 5 .0 0 B= .516Learners 5 • 038 .OUI U3.93 U0.12 S=1= -.90U.739
RI 1 • • • • .170 • • • • • 5.75 K= .881
Past 3 » # # * .101 # # # # # 12.00 B= .516
Learners .072 .062 18.90 15.87 8=1= .U06-,9U6
I 1 • • « • .350 • • • • • 1.87 K= .681
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• • • •
.135
.195.0U-6 • • • • •7.90 U.623U.00 B= .516
®PI = Free Interaction, RI = Restricted Interaction, I = Individuals
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were free to exchange information. Even with the extended 
model identical à values could not be used to solve equation 3* 
Since the expressions for the unknowns were identical in both 
equations, it was not possible to eliminate one of the unknowns 
by addition or subtraction or by substitution of the other; in­
stead Ô values for 1 and $ irrelevant bits of information were 
used and equation 3 was then solvable.
Table 13 discloses that the predicted errors for subjects 
in the PI condition and for fast and slow learners in the RI 
condition were quite close when compared to the actual errors 
obtained on the conceptual task. In the PI condition the ex­
tended model came within 1,^6 errors of making a perfect pre­
diction, while for fast learners in the RI condition the mod­
el was off by 3*03 errors, and 3*81 errors for slow learners.
In the I condition the original model's (Bourne & Restle, 1959) 
error predictions were inaccurate by 2^.1, Thus the model came 
much closer in predicting performance in the social condition 
than in the I condition. It was noted that the original model 
was capable of making error predictions with the same accuracy 
as the extended model (Pishkin & Blanchard, 19&3) in the social 
conditions. The disadvantage of using the original model was 
that the values of the social cues could not be established, for 
they became absorbed by k and B.
In addition to testing the accuracy of the predictions of 
of the model, a major aim of this research was to account for 
the effects of social cues on learning rates within the frame­
work of the extended model and to establish the values of
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social cues in situations where two individuals were free to 
interact and situations where interaction was restricted.
To reiterate, in the Pishkin and Blanchard (1963) extend­
ed social model, the numerator of equation 3 represents that 
portion of the cues which is relevant; the denominator, the 
total set of available cues that would interfere with Cl per­
formance, The proportion of relevant stimulus cues utilized 
is symbolized by the constant k; B, a constant, represents the 
amount of background irrelevant stimulation from the apparatus,
R+X+6+S 3
surround, and internal cues. The proportion of social cues 
utilized is 1; and S stands for the overall value of the 
social cue, i,e,, the other person. The values of k and B were 
constant for all conditions so that the facilitative and inhib- 
itive effects of social cues in the PI and RI conditions could 
be attributed to 1 and S, That is, if new values were estimated 
for k and B in the social conditions, k and B would absorb all 
the value from 1 and S,leaving 1 and S zero.
In the PI condition the values of social cues were posi­
tive, facilitating concept learning (Table 13). The high 
value of 1 indicated that a large proportion of the social 
cues were being utilized. The positive value of social cues in 
the numerator along with the low value of B in the denominator 
increased the proportion of relevant to irrelevant cues which 
theoretically accounts for the faster learning rates. The 
value of B (,5l6) was much lower than the value obtained by
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Bourne and Restle (1959), B = 3.^0; by Pishkin (1961), B = 2*6^; 
and by Pishkin and Blanchard (1963), B = 3«13« The introduction 
in the present experiment of a cubicle with soundproofing tile, 
in which the subjects were housed, apparently helped reduce the 
effects of background irrelevant stimulation from the apparatus 
and surround.
In contrast to the above findings, social cues in the RI 
condition interfered with Cl performance for both fast and 
slow learners (Table 13). For slow learners the value of the 
social cue was negative, interfering with performance. The 
high value of 1 indicated that slow learners were using a high 
proportion of the relevant social cues provided by their part­
ners, Although both fast and slow learners reached criterion 
to solution, slow learners in four instances were unable to 
state the solution, indicating that they were copying their 
partners. When considering that fast learners initiated more 
decisions, reached solution faster, and made less errors, the 
opportunity was present for the slow learners to rely on the 
relevant social cues provided by their partners. In view of 
the comparatively poor performance of the slow learners and 
the negative value of S, it seems reasonable to hypothesize 
that fast learners had a disruptive influence on performance 
and that slow learners did not make efficient use of the 
relevant social cues.
For fast learners the negative value of 1, and the low 
positive value of the social cue (slow learners) indicated 
that utilizing relevant cues of the slow learner interfered
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with performance. That fast learners' performance was overall 
not significantly different from individuals showed that the 
value of S (alow learner) was negligible.
The predictions of learning rates for individuals did not 
fit the data accurately. This discrepancy may be attributed to 
the low value of B, That is, reduction of irrelevant back­
ground cues by having subjects perform in a cubicle resulted 
in faster learning rates on the simpler problems (1 and 3 
irrelevant bits) in comparison with the most complex. The dif­
ference in errors between problems with 1 and 3 irrelevant bits 
was only 1.75» but between 1 and 5 irrelevant bits the error 
difference was 32.13» and between 3 and 5 irrelevant bits it was 
2 9.3 8* Thus, it appears that reduction of the size of back­
ground irrelevant cues has a differential effect on conceptual 
performance in that differences in performance are reduced be­
tween simpler tasks, but not between the simpler and most 
complex conceptual tasks. Unfortunately there have been no 
direct studies to test out the Bourne and Restle (1959) pre­
diction that reduction of background cues should improve per­
formance. The evidence from the present study suggests that 
reduction of background cues would improve performance on 
simpler Cl problems but not for the most complex problems.
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
The common finding that groups are superior to individuals 
in problem solving must be re-evaluated in terms of task com­
plexity and the group interaction condition. In the present 
study free interacting groups significantly outperformed indi­
viduals across all blocks of trials and at all levels of com­
plexity. The learning curves (Pigs, 2, 3» and l\.) revealed that 
error differences between free interacting groups and indivi­
duals became more pronounced as the complexity of the concept 
was increased. That PI groups were superior in Cl to the in­
dividual learner was in general agreement with the common 
finding of superiority of groups by investigators in the area 
of group problem solving (e.g., Bamlund, 1959; Paust, 1959; 
Goldman, 1965; Gurnee, 1939; Hoppe, 1959; Husband, 191+0; Perl- 
mutter & DeMontmollin, 1952; Shaw, 1952; Sperow, 1961; Restle 
& Davis, 1962; Thorndike, 193Ô)* None of the above investi­
gators made any attempts, however, to quantify or systemati­
cally evaluate the variable of task complexity when they made 
comparisons between individuals and group problem solving.
In the present study the variable of task complexity 
proved to be important in adding clarification to the gener-
58
59
ality that groups are superior to individuals. When compari­
sons were made between free interacting groups and individuals 
at each level of task complexity, free interacting groups sig­
nificantly outperformed individuals only on the most complex 
concepts (5 irrelevant bits). Factors that might account for 
PI groups being superior on the most complex concepts where 
the information load and number of alternative hypotheses 
are greatest would be that groups through discussion would have 
the advantage of drawing on two memories for recalling which 
hypotheses were correct or incorrect. Also, the chances of 
perseverating on an incorrect hypothesis would be reduced, 
since a subject would have to offer his partner a justifica­
tion for his persistently incorrect responses. To illustrate 
the last point, in the individual condition two subjects pur­
sued incorrect hypotheses throughout problems containing 5 
irrelevant bits and performed almost at the chance level; where­
as perseveration on incorrect hypotheses was at a minimum on 
the simpler concepts in the PI and I conditions. On the simp­
ler conceptual tasks where the information load, number of 
alternative hypotheses, and memory requirements were greatly 
reduced, the advantage of the group disappeared.
On the time dimension (minutes to solution) the superi­
ority of PI groups over individuals vanished. There were no 
statistical differences in time to solution between individuals 
and free interacting groups along all levels of task complex­
ity, When compared to individuals, the advantage of the PI 
group was that it was able to reduce errors, but it was unable
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to reduce the amount of solution time to less than that of in­
dividuals because of the time spent in discussion. Thus, on 
the time dimension, there was no difference in efficiency be­
tween individuals and PI groups in solving Cl problems.
The second group interaction condition that could be used 
to contrast with individuals was the RI group where pairs of 
subjects independently stated and registered their responses in 
full view of each other but could not discuss their answers.
In the previously cited studies concerning group versus indivi­
dual problem solving, the type of group on which the results 
were based was an interacting, face-to-face group. The re­
sults of the present study showed that individuals made sig­
nificantly fewer errors in Cl than pairs of subjects in the 
RI group and reached solution faster (8,l6 min. for I, 17.$0 
mln, for RI), These results indicate that it is necessary to 
consider the type of group interaction being compared to in­
dividuals before any generalizations can legitimately be made 
about group superiority.
Judging from the relatively poor performance of the RI 
group it is plausible to reason that more irrelevant, dis­
tracting cues were operating in the situation. The Cl task 
can be described as one that requires sustained attention, 
concentration, and reliance on memory of past and present 
information feedback. Subjects in the RI situation might have 
had difficulty in fully concentrating on their own hypotheses 
and feedback when almost at the same time additional informa­
tion was offered by their partners who were voicing and reg­
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istering similar or contrasting responses perhaps for different 
reasons.
In comparing the two interaction groups it was found that 
the PI group was superior to the RI group by making less errors 
across all blocks of trials and all levels of complexity and by 
reaching solution faster. In addition, there is some evidence 
to suggest that the nature of the interaction between the 
subjects in the PI group was one of cooperation. When a sub­
ject initiated a decision, usually after some discussion, the 
probability of its being adopted by his partner was ,99, in­
dicating that disagreements were at a minimum. This finding 
was consistent with the study of Bales and Borgatta (1955) 
who found when using the Bales interaction profile that cer­
tain unique aspects of two-person discussion groups were the 
low rates of showing disagreement and antagonism and the 
high rates of showing tension, asking for information and 
opinions. On the whole, the PI group may be described as be­
ing cooperative in their attempts to reach the common goal of 
solving Cl problems. In contrast, the subjects of the RI group 
could be described as having high tension, having little op­
portunity to establish a relationship with their partners, as 
being unable to reconcile differences through discussion while 
working toward independent goals.
In the RI group the fast learners were characterized as 
making fewer errors, attaining solution to the problem faster, 
initiating more decisions, and giving their answers quicker 
overall than the slow learners. However, when fast learners
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were compared to Individuals, there were no differences in time 
to solution and errors, but when compared to the PI group fast 
learners made more errors (5 times as many) while taking sig­
nificantly longer to reach solution. Assuming there is equal­
ity in the initial ability among subjects to perform a Cl task, 
then it could be reasoned that the relatively poor performance 
of the slow learners was due to social factors. Since fast 
learners in the RI group performed like individuals working 
alone, it is plausible that social influences were less detri­
mental for them. In the PI group there was no clear way of 
differentiating fast and slow learners since the overall error 
scores were so small (x = 2,29) end in 11 instances errors were 
equally divided between the two subjects. Perhaps with prob­
lems of greater complexity fast and slow learners could be 
more clearly differentiated in the PI group.
In the evaluation of task complexity, it was found that 
mean errors in 01 increased with increases in the amount of 
irrelevant information contained in the concept. These find­
ings are in agreement with the results obtained by a number 
of investigators (e.g.. Archer, Bourne, & Brown, 1955» Bourne, 
1957; Pishkin, I960; Pishkin & Wolfgang, 196ij.; Wargo, I960; 
Wolfgang, Pishkin, ic Lundy, 1962). An analysis of error dif­
ferences between each level of task complexity revealed that 
there were significant differences in errors between complex­
ity levels 1 and 5» and 3 and 5» but not between 1 and 3,
This finding is not surprising when considering that the total 
number of stimuli associated with each level of complexity
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does not increase in equal increments. In the present experi­
ment there was always one bit of relevant information accom­
panied by 1, 3, or 5 irrelevant bits. With each additional bit 
of information the number of possible stimuli doubled. Thus 
for problems with 1 irrelevant bit, there were four stimuli to 
categorize; with 3 irrelevant bits, 16 possible stimuli; and 
with 5 irrelevant bits there were 6I4. stimuli from which to 
make a choice. Consequently, the increase in the total number 
of stimuli to be categorized from 1 to 3 irrelevant bits was 
much smaller than from 1 to 5 > or 3 to 5 irrelevant bits.
The effects of task complexity on time to solution were 
similar to those obtained with mean errors; that is, it took 
progressively longer to reach solution with increases in the 
amount of irrelevant information. Correlations between time 
and errors were positive at all levels of task complexity.
These results are consistent with those of Archer, Bourne, and 
Brown (1955)» and Bourne (1957).
The performance of the subjects in the FI, RI, and I con­
ditions was assessed on problems with increasing complexity. 
Subjects in the I and RI conditions made an increasingly great­
er number of errors with increases in the complexity of the 
concept, whereas in the PI condition there was only a slight 
change in performance. In view of the slight nonsignificant 
deterioration in performance by subjects in the PI condition, 
it seems reasonable to expect that they would be able to 
solve concepts of greater complexity. At the present time the 
maximum number of irrelevant bits of information that has been
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introduced into two-choice problems for individuals has been 
five, A logical follow-up study would be to test and compare 
the limits of the capacity of individuals, free interacting 
groups, and restricted interaction groups for solving Cl prob­
lems of greater complexities.
In analysis of verbal activity for the PI groups revealed 
that there were insignificant increases in talk time, number of 
sequential utterances, and speech latency as a function of in­
creases in task complexity. There were also insignificant 
changes in the FI group in mean errors and mean time to solu­
tion with increases in task complexity. Thus measures of ver­
bal activity as well as measures for Cl performance (errors and 
time) did not reflect the typical linear curve. Significant 
positive correlations obtained between errors and talk time, 
errors and number of sequential utterances, and errors and 
latency of speech indicated that verbal activity was positive­
ly related to errors in Cl and not directly to task complexity. 
The extended mathematical model of Cl was tested for its 
accuracy in predicting learning rates for two group conditions; 
in one, pairs of subjects were free to interact and exchange 
information, and in the other, social interaction between 
pairs of subjects was restricted to simply stating individual 
responses. The predicted and obtained learning rates in both 
group conditions were in close agreement. Since the extended 
model has been shown to be effective in predicting learning 
rates in social situations ranging from highly restrictive.
65
where programmed stooges were used (Pishkin & Blanchard, I9 6 3 ), 
to situations where pairs of subjects were free to engage in 
discussion indicates that the model is quite powerful. Whether 
or not the model would be powerful enough to make successful 
predictions with larger-sized groups, varied populations, and 
in more natural settings awaits further research.
One of the basic postulates of the model is that the 
learning rate should decrease with increases in irrelevant in­
formation, However, that assumption was not confirmed in the 
FI condition where subjects showed no change in learning rate 
on problems with 1 and 3 irrelevant bits. Thus the model which 
bases its assumption, that increasing the number of irrelevant 
cues retards learning, on the performance of the individual 
needs to be revised or qualified for pairs of learners freely- 
exchanging information.
In establishing values of social cues for the two inter­
action conditions and assessing their effects on rates of 
learning in Cl, it was found that social cues facilitated 
learning in the PI groups, but Interfered with subjects' per­
formance in the RI groups. Subjects in the PI condition con­
sistently obtained higher 9 values for all levels of com­
plexity than subjects in the I and RI conditions, indicating 
that subjects in the PI group learned to identify the relevant 
cues faster. The positive values of both S and 1 reflected 
their fast learning rate. It seemed as though subjects in the 
PI group made better use of their resources than those in the 
RI group by cooperating with one another and using, in addi-
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tion to the relevant stimulus cues, a high proportion of the 
relevant social cues.
In contrast, the value of social cues for the slow learners 
in the RI condition was negative, indicating interference with 
learning, while for the fast learners the value of the social 
cue was negligible--only half the value obtained by the PI group. 
Since the fast learners performed at the same level as indivi­
duals working alone, it may be assumed that social cues had a 
negligible effect on their performance. The value of 1 for 
fast learners was negative, and for slow learners was positive, 
suggesting that slow learners attempted to use more of the 
relevant social cues provided by their partners. Studies by 
Lydecker, Pishkin, and Martin (I9 6I), Pishkin and Blanchard 
(1 9 6 3), and Wolfgang, Pishkin, and Lundy (1962) suggest that 
intelligence was not related to Cl performance within the sub­
ject populations used (chronic schizophrenics and psychiatric 
aides with varying degrees of education). In view of the find­
ings on intelligence, it is likely that the differences between 
fast and slow learners would be due to other factors.
Perhaps, in addition to social factors, personality (e.g,, 
dominance, independence), and strategies used by the subject 
may have contributed in different degrees to the differences in 
performance between the fast and slow learners, Pishkin (1961) 
found that individual differences in subjects' approach to Cl 
problems was an important variable. He discovered that indivi­
duals using a systematic approach were more efficient in dis-
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carding irrelevant cues (as reflected in the higher k value) 
than subjects who did not start out with a systematic approach
to a task. Since k could not be estimated in the social condi­
tions because it contributed to deflating the values of social 
cues to zero, there was no direct way to independently assess 
the values of k for fast and slow learners. For future re­
search one way of obtaining independent estimates of k for fast 
and slow learners would be to have them perform alone.
The mathematical model was not successful in predicting 
accurately the errors for the individual learner. The dis­
crepancy could be explained in terms of the reduction of back­
ground irrelevant cues having a differential effect on per­
formance with problems of different levels of complexity. In 
the present experiment the value B was much lower than that ob­
tained by other experimenters using a similar apparatus and 
procedure (e.g.. Bourne & Restle, 1959). However, unlike 
Bourne and Restle's (1959) study, the subjects were placed in a 
semi-soundproof cubicle where only the screen and the panel 
board were in direct view. In the present experimental setting 
where background cues were reduced, error differences between 
the simpler concepts were small, but not between the simple 
and the most complex tasks. The Bourne and Restle (1959) mod­
el predicts that reduction in background irrelevant stimula­
tion should facilitate concept learning; however, the present 
findings suggest that this prediction would hold true on 
simpler Cl tasks, but not necessarily for the most complex 
concepts. At present there have not been any studies reported
68
that have systematically varied background cues in Cl,
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The primary aims of the present experiment were first to 
evaluate the effects of social cues on learning rates in con­
cept identification (Cl) within the framework of the extended 
Bourne and Restle (1959) mathematical model of concept identi­
fication (Pishkin & Blanchard, I9 6 3) and to establish theo­
retical values of social cues in both a free and restricted 
social interaction setting; second, to investigate the effec­
tiveness of two-person groups, free to interact, in compari­
son with restricted interaction two-person groups and indivi­
duals working alone in learning Cl problems of different 
levels of complexity. On the basis of the findings in the area 
of group problem solving, it was predicted that freely inter­
acting groups would be superior to their controls, the re­
stricted interaction groups, and to individuals. The last 
aim was exploratory, i.e., to investigate the relationship of 
a series of social interaction measures in the free interaction 
(PI) and restricted interaction (Rl) groups to concept identi­
fication performance.
Subjects were 120 male volunteer students in elementary 
psychology courses, who were randomly divided into nine
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treatment groups. Students assigned to two-man groups, who 
acknowledged they were friends were randomly reassigned to 
other conditions, A 3 x 3 factorial design was used, which 
included 3 levels of complexity (1, 3» and 5 irrelevant bits 
of information) and three interaction levels with one or two 
subjects operating in one of three conditions. In Condition I, 
subjects performed alonej in Condition II, subjects in two-man 
groups were free to interactand in Condition III, interac­
tion between two subjects was restricted to each subject's 
simply stating and registering his individual responses. Sub­
ject's task was to learn to correctly categorize a series of 
geometric patterns flashed on the screen in accordance with the 
relevant dimension. Criterion of solution was 16 consecutive 
correct responses.
In terms of the extended mathematical model, the results 
indicated that its predictions of errors for subjects in the 
PI and RI groups were in close agreement with the data. How­
ever, for individuals the predictions were not accurate. The 
basic assumption of the model that learning rates decrease 
with increases in the amount of irrelevant information in the 
problem was not confirmed in the free interaction condition. 
Learning rates were highest in the PI condition, lowest in the 
RI condition, with the individual performance falling in be­
tween, indicating that subjects in the PI condition were the 
most efficient in identifying relevant information. Values of 
social cues were established; in the PI group, social cues 
facilitated learning, but in the RI group they retarded it.
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The usual finding that groups are superior to individuals 
in problem solving needs to be reassessed in terms of task 
complexity and the group interaction condition. Error differ­
ences between individuals and PI groups became more pronounced 
as the complexity of the concept increased. Subjects in the 
FI group significantly outperformed individuals only on the most 
complex concepts (5 irrelevant bits). On the time dimension 
(minutes to solution) there was no statistical difference in 
efficiency between individuals and PI groups in solving Cl 
problems.
The restricted interaction group was found to be one group 
that was not superior to individuals or the PI group, for both 
individuals and PI groups outperformed subjects in the RI group 
by making less errors and reaching solution to the problem 
faster. In the HI condition fast learners were characterized 
as making fewer errors, as being generally faster in giving 
answers, as reaching solution faster, and as initiating more 
decisions than the slow learners.
In investigating the variable of task complexity, analysis 
revealed that mean errors and mean time to solution increased 
with increases in the number of irrelevant bits of information 
contained in the concept. Correlations between time and errors 
were positive at all levels of task complexity. In contrast to 
subjects in the RI and I conditions, subjects in the PI condi­
tion showed only a slight change in performance on concepts 
with increasing complexity, indicating that they could cope 
with concepts of greater complexity.
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An analysis of verbal activity in the PI group revealed 
that there were insignificant increases in talk time, number 
of sequential utterances, and speech latency as a function of 
increases in task complexity. However, significant positive 
correlations were obtained between errors and number of se­
quential utterances, errors and talk time, and errors and 
latency of speech, indicating that verbal activity was posi­
tively related to errors and not directly to increases in task 
complexity.
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Instructions for Individual and Free Interaction Conditions
After the experimenter placed the chest microphone on the 
subject(s), he delivered the following Instructions;
Try to speak Into the cone where the microphone Is located 
and try to avoid speaking In a very loud or very soft voice. 
Your conversational voice would he fine,
I want to see how well you can do on this problem. There 
will be a series of geometric patterns appearing on this screen. 
Your Job Is to classify these patterns Into two categories,
A or B, After each pattern appears, I want you to guess which 
one of the two buttons you should press, A or B, For example.
If It was the position of the pattern that made the difference 
In your choice of buttons, you would push button A whenever the 
pattern was on top of the screen and push button B whenever the 
pattern was on the bottom. If you pushed the right button and 
the right light above It lit up you would know that you were 
right. If you pushed the right button and the left light lit 
up, you would know that your choice of buttons was wrong, 
(Demonstrate with two cards, one with a circle on the top and 
one with a circle on the bottom,) In this example your choice 
of buttons, A or B, was determined by the position of the 
patterns only. You may take as much time as you wish In making 
your decision as to which button to press. Any questions?
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Additional Instructions for sub.1 ects In the free Inter­
acting group. Since you can register only one decision at a 
time, the two of you may discuss your answers for as long as 
you wish before the two of you agree upon a single answer.
When you have decided upon a single answer you may register 
It by pressing one of the two buttons. Any questions?
Instructions for Restricted Interaction Condition 
After the experimenter placed the chest microphone on 
the subjects, he delivered the following Instructions:
Try to speak Into the cone where the microphone Is located 
and try to avoid speaking in a very loud or very soft voice. 
Your conversational voice would be fine,
I want to see how well you can do on this problem. There 
will be a series of geometric patterns appearing on this screen* 
Your job Is to classify these patterns Into two categories,
A or B, After each pattern appears, I want each of you to re­
spond separately by saying A or B only, and then press button 
A or button B, so that your decision will be recorded. No 
further communication Is permitted between you. For example.
If it was the position of the pattern that made the difference 
In your saying A or B, then you would say A and depress button 
A whenever the pattern was on top and say B and press button B 
whenever the pattern was on the bottom. If you said A and 
pressed A and the light above button A lit up, that meant that 
you were right; but If you said A and pressed A, and the light 
lit up above the B button, you would know that your choice was
62
wrong, (Demonstrate with two cards, one with a circle on the 
top and one with a circle on the bottom.) In this example 
your choice of saying and pressing button A or B was determined 
by the position of the patterns only. You may take as much 
time as you wish in making your decision to respond by saying 
A or B and then pressing button A or B, Remember, no com­
munication is allowed between you beyond saying A or B. Any 
questions?
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1 4.75 FI 2,29
3 12.12 RI 29.75
5 2 8 ,6 6 I 13.50
Table 1$
Mean Errors as a Function of Interaction Levels 




















Mean Time to Solution for Main Effects 










Mean Time to 
Solution 
in Minutes
1 5.58 FI 6 .4 2
3 9.75 RI 17.50
5 16.79 I 8.16
Table 1?
Mean Time to Solution in Minutes as a Function of 























Means of Errors, Decisions Initiated, Solution Time 
And Speech Latency for Past and Slow Learners 
In the Restricted Interaction Condition
Bits of Irrelevant Information
1 3 5
Fast Slow Fast Slow Fast Slow
Mean errors 5.75 8.50 12.00 25.00 15.87 4 0 .1 2
Time to solution 
in minutes 6.62 9.00 11.12 18.37 11.50 25.00
Mean no. decisions 
initiated 23.00 18.00 71.00 22.37 78.67 41.12
Latency of speech 
utterances in 
seconds 165.00 201.25 257.87 37^.50 434.37 563.87
C DO'
APPENDIX C
ANALYSIS OP POSITION EFFECTS
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Analysis of Seating Position and 
Verbal Interaction
An exploratory analysis was made to evaluate the relation­
ship between seating position and verbal Interaction. The num­
ber of times subjects seated on the left and right initiated 
discussion was totalled. No significant differences In Initi­
ation of conversation were found on problems with 1 ^t = 1,06,
df = 7, E >.05), 3 (t = .68, df = 7, g >.0^), and 5 (t = 1.55»
df = 7, 2 >  ,05) Irrelevant bits as a function of seating posi­
tion.
Similar results were obtained concerning the relationship 
of seating position to latency of speech for concepts with 1
(t = .20, df = 7, £ >.05), 3 (t = ,11, df = 7, £ >.05), and
5 (t = ,]̂ -9, df = 7, £  >  .05) Irrelevant bits. Latency of
speech was defined as the time that had elapsed In seconds after 
the experimenter's feedback and the first speech utterance of 
each subject.
Lastly, no significant differences In talk time were found 
between subjects solving concepts with 1 (_t = ,1|0, df = 7,
£ >.05), 3 (t = 1.78, df = 7, £  >.05), and 5 (t = 2.19, df =
7, £  >,05) Irrelevant bits as a function of seating position. 
Thus the results Indicate that verbal activity was not signif­
icantly Influenced by seating position. These findings are 
consistent with those In the RI condition where no differences 
were found In errors between subjects who seated themselves 
more to the left or right portion of the screen.
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Table 19
Mean Errors on the Right and Left Response Buttons 









Subjects 1 k.62 3.12
on the left
3 8.75 8 . 7 5
5 12.87 11.12
Subjects 1 4 . 7 5 1.62on the right
3 10.62 9.50
5 15.12 16.37
Note,-Each mean is b a s e d  on an N of 8.
